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Group Lending Without Joint Liability
Jonathan de Quidt⇤ Thiemo Fetzer† Maitreesh Ghatak†
September 29, 2014
Abstract
This paper contrasts individual liability lending with and without groups to joint
liability lending. We are motivated by an apparent shift away from the use of joint
liability by microfinance institutions, combined with recent evidence that a) converting
joint liability groups to individual liability groups did not a↵ect repayment rates, and
b) an intervention that increased social capital in individual liability borrowing groups
led to improved repayment performance. First, we show that individual lending with
or without groups may constitute a welfare improvement over joint liability, so long as
borrowers have su cient social capital to sustain mutual insurance. Second, we explore
how the lender’s lower transaction costs in group lending can encourage insurance by
reducing the amount borrowers have to pay to bail one another out. Third, we discuss
how group meetings might encourage insurance, either by increasing the incentive to
invest in social capital, or because the time spent in meetings can facilitate setting up
insurance arrangements. Finally, we perform a simple simulation exercise, evaluating
quantitatively the welfare impacts of alternative forms of lending and how they relate
to social capital.
Keywords: micro finance; group lending; joint liability; mutual insurance
1 Introduction
While joint liability lending by microfinance institutions (MFIs) continues to attract atten-
tion as a key vehicle of lending to the poor, recently some MFIs have moved away from
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explicit joint liability towards individual lending. The most prominent such institutions are
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and BancoSol of Bolivia.1 However, interestingly, Grameen
and other such MFIs who have made this shift have chosen to retain the regular group
meetings that traditionally went hand-in-hand with joint liability lending.
It is not clear what are the factors actually driving this trend, to the exent it exists.2
Nevertheless, these phenomena raise the question of the costs and benefits of using joint
liability, and the choice between group loans with and without (explicit) joint liability. The
existing literature, in general, has focused more on the benefits of joint liability. Besley and
Coate (1995) is an early exception, showing that while joint liability can increase repayment
rates by inducing borrowers to insure one another (repaying on behalf of their unsuccessful
partners), there are also states of the world where a borrower who is expected to repay her
partner’s loan may instead default, even though she would be willing and able to pay back
her own loan. Using a limited enforcement or “ex-post moral hazard” framework introduced
in the group lending context by Besley and Coate (1995), in this paper we study several
issues raised by this apparent shift.
Our analysis is motivated by evidence from Gine´ and Karlan (2014) who find that ran-
domly converting joint liability groups to individual liability at a Philippines MFI had no
e↵ect on average repayment rates. We analyze how by leveraging the social capital of borrow-
ers, individual liability lending (henceforth, IL) can mimic or even improve on the insurance
arrangement reached under explicit joint liability (EJ), increasing repayment and borrower
welfare. When this occurs, we term it “implicit joint liability” (IJ). Intuitively, in those states
of the world where a borrower is able to repay her own loan but not that of her partner, IJ
allows her to do this, yet in states of the world where she could repay her partner’s loan,
social capital is leveraged to encourage her to do so. EJ does not permit such flexibility. The
model has subtle implications for contract choice. From the existing literature, the general
impression is that all else equal, more social capital increases the advantage of explicit joint
liability relative to individual liability, such that individual liability is optimal for low social
capital and joint liability for high social capital. We show that the relationship is not so
straightforward. For low social capital, individual liability is still preferred, for intermediate
1For a discussion of the reasons for the shift in Grameen Bank’s lending strategy, see Muhammad Yunus’s
article “Grameen Bank II: Lessons Learnt Over Quarter of A Century,” at http://www.grameen.com/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=30&Itemid=0, accessed 18 December 2012.
2In a companion paper (de Quidt et al., 2013), we present data from the MIX Market suggesting a modest
decline in the use of “solidarity group” lending between 2008 and 2010 (the years for which good quality data
on lending methods are available). This is the closest measure we have of the use of explicit joint liability.
Solidarity group loans are those for which “some aspect of loan consideration depends on the group, including
credit analysis, liability, guarantee, collateral, and loan size and conditions” (see http://www.mixmarket.
org/about/faqs/glossary). In that paper we propose a theoretical argument that commercialization, in
particular, the rise of for-profit MFIs, could be playing a role in the decline of joint liability lending.
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levels of social capital, explicit joint liability is preferred, but for high social capital individ-
ual liability can once again dominate, due to its ability to induce welfare-improving implicit
joint liability.
Since the previous argument does not rely on borrowing groups (though we believe im-
plicit joint liability is likely to be easier in a group context), we next introduce a purely
operational argument for group lending under IL. Group lending can reduce the lender’s
transactions costs, shifting the time burden to the borrowers. This is valuable because it en-
ables the lender to cut interest rates, relaxing the borrowers’ repayment incentive constraints,
thus increasing repayment and welfare.
Finally, we consider evidence from Feigenberg et al. (2013), who find that an increase in
the meeting frequency of individual liability borrowing groups created social capital, which
led to a subsequent improvement in repayment rates. We discuss two mechanisms by which
group meetings could create social capital or foster mutual insurance. First, because the
more time borrowers spend together in groups, the more incentive they have to invest in
social capital. Second, because maintaining an insurance arrangement requires spending
time together, so group meetings can serve the dual purpose of repayment and insurance.
Both mechanisms suggest that increasing meeting length or frequency could lead to more
mutual insurance, however if borrowers are able to coordinate among themselves to spend
time together, independent of the lender, artificially increasing meeting length or frequency
with the aim of fostering insurance cannot increase welfare. In other words, an additional
friction is required for the intervention of Feigenberg et al. (2013) to be welfare-improving.
Without any concrete evidence we can only speculate about what our theory implies
about the apparent shift away from EJ to IL. The first part of our argument suggests that
switching from EJ to IL can increase repayment rates if borrowers have su cient social cap-
ital. This prediction is consistent with the evidence from Gine´ and Karlan (2014). Although
the average e↵ect on repayment of conversion to individual liability was zero, interestingly,
repayment improved among borrowers with strong social ties, and deteriorated among bor-
rowers with weak social ties, consistent with our theory.3 The third part of our argument
suggests that the creation of social capital through EJ may have paved the path for IJ in
some cases, to the extent it became the more e cient lending arrangement.
Finally, we carry out some simple simulation exercises using empirically estimated param-
eters. The goal is to complement the theoretical analysis and to get a quantitative sense of
the welfare e↵ects as well as the relevant parameter thresholds that determine which lending
3See Gine´ and Karlan (2014), table 8. This suggests that the joint distributions of social capital and
returns (which determine the size of the changes in repayment rates) are such that the two e↵ects average
out to zero.
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method is preferred. Our key findings are as follows. First, in low social capital environ-
ments, EJ does well compared to IJ. For example, at our benchmark parameter values, when
social capital is worth 10% of the loan size, the welfare attainable under IJ is 32.4% lower
than that under EJ. However, with social capital worth 50% of the loan size, the welfare
attainable under EJ is 5% lower than under IJ, and the advantage of IJ grows as the variance
of borrower income increases. Second, we find that the interest rate, repayment rate and
borrower welfare are all insensitive to social capital under EJ, whereas in the case of IJ, they
are all highly sensitive. This is what we would expect, since EJ leverages both social capital
and joint liability, while IJ leverages only social capital. To illustrate, under our benchmark
parameter values, an increase in social capital from 10% of the loan size to 50% of the loan
size increases borrower welfare under IJ by around 50%, while the e↵ect is negligible under
EJ. When borrower incomes are uncorrelated, the insensitivity of EJ to the level of social
capital suggests that it is a fairly robust contracting tool across lending contexts. However,
when borrower incomes are positively correlated the advantage of EJ disappears. Intuitively,
EJ requires groups to either all repay or all default. When incomes are positively correlated
it is common to have multiple project failures, and since bailing all of them out is hard, the
whole group defaults. IJ is robust to such states of the world because it does not require the
whole group to repay.4
Although the model highlights the potential costs of EJ, it is premature to write o↵
EJ as a valuable contractual tool. Thus far we have one high quality randomized study
of contractual form (Gine´ and Karlan, 2014) in which EJ seems not to play an important
role. However in our theoretical analysis there are always parameter regions over which EJ
is the most e cient of the simple contracts we analyze. A recent randomized control trial by
Attanasio et al. (2011) finds stronger consumption and business creation impacts under EJ
(albeit no significant di↵erence in repayment rates - note that in their context mandatory
group meetings are not used under either IL or EJ). Carpena et al. (2010) analyze an episode
in which a lender switched from IL to EJ and found a significant improvement in repayment
performance. For the same reasons, Banerjee (2012) stresses the need for more empirical
work in the vein of Gine´ and Karlan (2014) before concluding that EJ is no longer relevant.
It is instructive to briefly look at the types of contracts currently used by MFIs. Cull
et al. (2009) find that around two thirds of the MFIs in their sample (drawn from the
MIX Market) predominantly use solidarity group loans (see footnote 2 above) or village
banking, while around one third use individual lending; we find similar figures in de Quidt
et al. (2013). Our concept of IJ is relevant to the “individual” category; the MIX Market
notes that “loans based on consideration of the sole borrower, but disbursed through and
4See also Allen (2014) for closely related discussions.
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recollected from group mechanisms, are still considered individual loans.” A notable example
is the Indian MFI Bandhan, which is one of the top MFIs in India, and is listed as having
3.6m outstanding loans in 2011. Bandhan does not use joint liability but disburses the
majority of its loans through borrowing groups. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the
method of disbursement of the sample of loans classified as individual, but we believe that
many institutions are indeed using groups to disburse individual loans.
Much of the existing theoretical work has sought to characterize conditions under which
explicit joint liability can lead to e ciency gains compared to traditional individual liability
loans (see Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) for a review) by relaxing the underlying incentive
or self-selection constraints. Since most of the literature assumed competitive lenders, the
benefits of these gains are passed on to borrowers via relaxation of borrowing constraints,
and/or lower interest rates. A key mechanism that is used to explain persistence of poverty
in development economics has at its centre credit market imperfections, which are caused
by informational and institutional frictions. While these can to some degree be mitigated by
the use of collateral, by definition the poor do not have much in the way of collateralizable
wealth. Therefore, they are likely to be credit constrained, thereby leading to a vicious
cycle. A lot of the attention attracted by microfinance is because of its potential ability to
tap into the information and enforcement advantages of the social networks the borrowers
belong to, and harness it via joint liability to relax borrowing constraints. The literature has
rationalized group lending starting with alternative types of credit market frictions–adverse
selection, ex ante moral hazard, and ex post moral hazard or costly state verification–by
highlighting the role of joint liability in generating peer selection, peer monitoring, and peer
pressure. One of the broad theoretical points that emerge from the existing literature is that
joint-liability loans are not always feasible, or even if they are, are not always e cient relative
to individual-liability loans. Therefore, the fact that joint liability has both costs and benefits
has always been implicit in the literature, but the focus mainly has been on mechanisms that
harness the benefits. The model of Besley and Coate (1995), which is closest to ours in terms
of the underlying credit market friction of ex post moral hazard, is an exception. It shows
that joint liability gives borrowers an incentive to repay on behalf of their partner when the
partner is unable to repay her own loan. If borrowers can threaten social sanctions against
one another, this e↵ect is strengthened further. However, there are two problems with EJ.
Firstly, since repaying on behalf of a partner will be costly, incentive compatibility requires
the lender to use large sanctions and/or charge lower interest rates, relative to individual
liability.5 Secondly, when a borrower is unsuccessful, sometimes EJ induces the successful
5This issue is the focus of the analysis in Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2010). Because of this, de Quidt et al. (2013)
show that with a for-profit monopolist lender borrowers are better o↵ under EJ than IL lending, because
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partner to bail them out, but sometimes it has a perverse e↵ect, inducing them to default
completely, while under IL they would have repaid. Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004) and Bhole and
Ogden (2010) approach these issues from a mechanism design perspective - designing cross-
reporting mechanisms or stochastic dynamic incentives that minimize the sanctions used by
the lender. Baland et al. (2013) provide an alternative explanation of the apparent trend
away from what we call EJ towards IL, based on loan size. They find that the largest loan
o↵ered under IL cannot be supported under joint liability, and for borrowers with access to
both types of lending arrangements, the benefits from the latter are increasing in borrower
wealth. We do not focus on this angle but briefly touch on the issue of loan size in section
2.5. Allen (2014) shows how partial EJ, whereby borrowers are liable only for a fraction
of their partner’s repayment, can improve repayment performance by optimally trading o↵
risk-sharing with the perverse e↵ect on strategic default. We focus on how simple individual
liability lending with no joint liability can achieve these e↵ects, as side-contracting by the
borrowers can substitute for the lender’s enforcement mechanism.
Our model is also related to Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2010). In that paper, borrowers are as-
sumed to have enough social capital to support incentive-compatible loan guarantees through
a side-contract, provided they have su cient information to enforce such side contracts. The
role of groups is to provide publicly observable repayment so as to enable e cient side-
contracting. In contrast, in our setting, repayment behavior is common knowledge among
the borrowers, and it is the amount of social capital that is key. Groups play a role that
depends on meeting costs and time use introduced in the next two sections.6
Other than the above mentioned papers, our paper is also broadly related to the the-
oretical literature in microfinance that has emerged in the light of the Grameen Bank of
Bangladesh abandoning explicit joint liability and switching to the Grameen II model, focus-
ing on aspects other than joint liability, such as sequential lending (e.g., Chowdhury, 2005),
frequent repayment (Jain and Mansuri, 2003; Fischer and Ghatak, 2010), exploring more
general mechanisms than joint liability (e.g., La↵ont and Rey, 2003), and exploring market
and general equilibrium (Ahlin and Jiang, 2008; McIntosh and Wydick, 2005; de Quidt et al.,
2013).
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we present the basic model where in
principle lending may take place with or without group meetings. We introduce our concept
of implicit joint liability and show when it will occur and be welfare improving. Section 3
the lender must typically charge lower interest rates under EJ.
6Furthermore, in our model, borrowers are better o↵ when they guarantee one another as their probability
of contract renewal is higher. In Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2010) this is not the case as the lender is assumed to
use a punishment that simply imposes a utility cost on the borrowers in case of default. In fact, the optimal
contract delivers the same borrower welfare whether they guarantee one another or not.
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formalizes a key transaction cost in group and individual lending - the time spent attending
repayment meetings. Section 4 then shows how meeting costs can give borrowers incentives
to invest in social capital. Section 5 presents results of a simulation of the core model, and
section 6 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Model
We model a lending environment characterized by costly state verification and limited liabil-
ity. Borrowers are risk neutral, have zero outside option, no savings technology and limited
liability. They have access to a stochastic production technology that requires 1 unit of cap-
ital per period with expected output R¯, and therefore must borrow 1 per period to invest.
There are three possible output realizations, R 2 {Rh, Rm, 0}, Rh   Rm > 0 which occur
with positive probabilities ph, pm and 1  ph   pm respectively. We define the following:
p ⌘ ph + pm
4 ⌘ ph   pm
R¯ ⌘ phRh + pmRm.
We will refer to p as the probability of “success”, and R¯ as expected output.
We assume that output is not observable to the lender and hence the only relevant
state variable from his perspective is whether or not a loan is repaid. Since output is non-
contractible, the lender uses dynamic repayment incentives, as in Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990). We assume that if a borrower’s loan contract is terminated following a default, she
can never borrow again. Under individual liability (IL), a borrower’s contract is renewed if
she repays and terminated otherwise. Under explicit joint liability (EJ), both contracts are
renewed if and only if both loans are repaid.7
We assume that pairs of individuals in the village share some pair-specific social capital
7The assumptions of no savings, permanent exclusion and simple contracts are fairly standard in this
literature. No savings is necessary for dynamic incentives to be e↵ective (Bulow and Rogo↵, 1989), but we
think not too extreme an assumption in the microfinance context, see e.g. Dupas and Robinson (2013a,b).
There is some evidence (e.g. Allen, 2014) and plenty of theoretical work on more flexible contracts, e.g.
Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004), Tedeschi (2006), Bhole and Ogden (2010), de Quidt et al. (2013), we assume
strict dynamic incentives and simple contracts to focus attention on the key social capital mechanism,
and because we believe these are a good approximation to typical MFI practices. Relaxing the strength
of dynamic incentives (for example by terminating with some probability smaller than one in the case of
default) increases borrower welfare, but it cannot eliminate the central ine ciency in joint liability lending,
namely that the lender must sometimes punish a borrower who could not repay her partner’s loan but would
have repaid her own. This ine ciency stems from the fact that the lender cannot observe the state of the
world (income realizations), while borrowers are able to so can more e ciently contract on such states.
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worth S in discounted lifetime utility, that either can credibly threaten to destroy. In other
words, a friendship yields lifetime utility S to each person. If the social capital is destroyed
it is lost forever. We assume that each individual has a very large number of friends, each
worth S. Thus each friendship that breaks up represents a loss of size S. We discuss
microfoundations for S in section 2.4 below.
We assume a single lender with opportunity cost of funds equal to ⇢ > 1. In the first
period, the lender enters the community, observes S and commits to a contract to all potential
borrowers. The contract specifies a gross interest rate, r and EJ or IL. We assume the lender
to be a non-profit who o↵ers the borrower welfare maximizing contract, subject to a zero-
profit constraint.8
In this section we ignore the role of groups altogether - being in a group or not has no
e↵ect on the information or cost structure faced by borrowers and lenders. Although borrower
output is unobservable to the lender, we assume it is observable to other borrowers. As a
result, they are able to write informal side contracts to guarantee one another’s repayments,
conditional on the output realizations. For simplicity, in the theoretical analysis we assume
such arrangements are formed between pairs of borrowers.9
EJ borrowers will naturally side contract with their partner, with whom they are already
bound by the EJ clause. Specifically, we assume that once the loan contract has been fixed,
pairs of borrowers can agree a “repayment rule” which specifies each member’s repayment
in each possible state Y 2 {Rh, Rm, 0} ⇥ {Rh, Rm, 0}. Then in each period, they observe
the state and make their repayments in a simultaneous-move “repayment game”. Deviations
from the agreed repayment rule are punished by a social sanction: destruction of S. The
repayment rule, social sanction and liability structure of the borrowing contract thus deter-
mine the payo↵s of the repayment game and beliefs about the other borrower’s strategy. To
summarize, once the lender has entered and committed to the contract, the timings each
period are:
1. Borrowers form pairs, and agree on a repayment rule.
2. Loans are disbursed, borrowers observe the state and simultaneously make repayments
(the repayment game).
3. Conditional on repayments, contracts are renewed or terminated and social sanctions
carried out.
8We abstract from other organizational issues related to non-profits, see e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer (2001).
9This could be for example because there are two types of investment project available and returns within
a project type are perfectly correlated, such that side-contracting with another borrower who has the same
project type yields no benefit. In the simulations we extend the analysis to larger groups.
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4. If an IL borrower’s partner was terminated but she repaid, she rematches with a new
partner.
We restrict attention to repayment rules that are stationary (depending only on the
state) and symmetric (do not depend on the identity of the borrower). This enables us to
focus on the stationary value function of a representative borrower. Stationarity also rules
out repayment rules that depend on repayment histories, such as reciprocal arrangements.
In addition, we assume that the borrowers choose the repayment rule to maximize joint
welfare. Welfare maximization implies that social sanctions are never used on the equilibrium
path, since joint surplus would be increased by an alternative repayment rule that did not
punish this specific deviation. In other words, although there may be many equilibria of
the repayment game and associated social game as defined below: we focus on the welfare
maximizing one.10
Given repayment probability ⇡, the lender’s profits are:
⇧ = ⇡r   ⇢
and therefore the zero-profit interest rate is:
rˆ ⌘ ⇢
⇡
. (1)
By symmetry, for interest rate r, each borrower i pays ⇡r per period in expectation.
There are two interesting cases that arise endogenously and determine the feasibility of
borrowers guaranteeing one another’s loans. In Case A, Rm   2r and hence a successful
borrower can always a↵ord to repay both loans. In Case B we have Rh   2r > Rm   r, thus
it is not feasible for a borrower with output Rm to repay both loans. Case B will turn out
to be the more interesting case for our analysis, since in this case there is a cost to using
joint liability lending. Specifically there are states of the world (when one borrower has
zero output and the other has Rm) in which under joint liability both borrowers will default,
since it is not feasible to repay both loans and they will therefore be punished whether or not
the successful partner repays her loan. Meanwhile under individual liability, the successful
partner is able to repay her loan and will not be punished if she does so.
Consider Case A. If borrowers agree to guarantee one another’s loans, they will repay in
every state except (0, 0), so the repayment probability is ⇡ = 1   (1   p)2 = p(2   p), in
which case rˆ = ⇢p(2 p) . Therefore Case A applies if Rm   2⇢p(2 p) , i.e. when the successful
10A key implicit assumption is that borrowers cannot renegotiate on social sanctions, otherwise they would
never be enacted o↵ the equilibrium path either, and social sanctions would be ine↵ective.
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partner can a↵ord to repay both loans even if her income is only Rm. If this condition does
not hold, then it will not be feasible for the successful borrower to help her partner in this
state of the world, and therefore Case B applies.
Definition 1 Case A applies when Rm   2⇢p(2 p) . Case B applies when Rm < 2⇢p(2 p) .
Suppose that borrowers only repay when both are successful, i.e. when both have at
least Rm, which occurs with probability p2. If this is the equilibrium repayment rate, then
rˆ = ⇢p2 . We make a simple parameter assumption that ensures that this will be the highest
possible equilibrium interest rate (lowest possible repayment rate), by ensuring that even
with income Rm, borrowers can a↵ord to repay
⇢
p2 .
Assumption 1 Rm   ⇢p2 .
We also assume that Rh is su ciently large that a borrower with Rh could a↵ord to repay
both loans even at interest rate rˆ = ⇢p2 . Since this is the highest possible equilibrium interest
rate, this implies that Rh is always su ciently large for a borrower to repay both loans.
Assumption 2 Rh   2 ⇢p2 .
To summarize, together these assumptions guarantee that Rm   r and Rh   2r on the
equilibrium path.
We can now write down the value function V for the representative borrower, which
represents the utility from access to credit. Suppose that borrower i’s loan is repaid with
some probability ⇡. Since the repayment rule is assumed to maximize joint welfare, it
follows that borrowers’s loans are only repaid when repayment leads to the loan contracts
being renewed, and therefore the representative borrower’s contract is also renewed with
probability ⇡. The lender charges an interest rate that yields zero expected profits, rˆ = ⇢⇡ ,
so the borrower repays ⇡rˆ = ⇢ in expectation. Hence, (by stationarity) her welfare is:
V = R¯  ⇢+  ⇡V
=
R¯  ⇢
1   ⇡ . (2)
Given that we normalize the outside option to zero, for any borrower to be willing to
repay her loan, the following condition needs to hold:  r +  V   0. In other words, the
value of access to future loans must exceed the interest rate, r   V . If this condition
does not hold, all borrowers will default immediately. We refer to this condition as Incentive
Condition 1 (IC1), and it must hold under any equilibrium contract.
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Provided IC1 is satisfied, borrower welfare is maximized by achieving the highest re-
payment rate possible. To see this, suppose the lender charges some interest rate r. Then
V = R¯ ⇡r1  ⇡ . It can be verified that this is increasing in ⇡ if and only if IC1 holds. Therefore,
since ⇡r = ⇢ in equilibrium, in the subsequent discussion the welfare ranking of contracts
will be equivalent to the ranking in terms of the repayment probability.
Using (2) and rˆ = ⇢⇡ we can derive the equilibrium IC1 explicitly:
⇢   ⇡R¯. (IC1)
By Assumption 1, the lowest possible equilibrium repayment probability ⇡ is equal to p2.
For the theoretical analysis we make the following parameter assumption that ensures IC1
is satisfied in equilibrium:
Assumption 3  p2R¯ > ⇢.
Now that the model is set up we analyze the choice of contract type.
2.1 Individual Liability
Suppose first of all that the borrower does not reach a repayment guarantee arrangement
with a partner. Since IC1 is satisfied, the borrower will repay her own loan whenever she is
successful, so her repayment probability is p. Her utility V is then equal to R¯ ⇢1  p .
Now we consider when pairs of IL borrowers will agree a repayment guarantee arrange-
ment. If this occurs, we term it implicit joint liability (IJ). Note that at present borrowing
groups are not required for this to take place.
Since IC1 holds, the borrowers want to agree on a repayment rule that maximizes their
repayment probability. There are many possible such rules that can achieve the same re-
payment rate, so for simplicity we focus on the most intuitive one: borrowers agree to repay
their own loan whenever they are successful, and also repay their unsuccessful partner’s loan
if possible.11
We already know that repayment of the borrower’s own loan is incentive compatible by
IC1. For it to be incentive compatible for her to repay on behalf of her partner as well, it
must be that social sanction outweighs the cost of the extra repayment, i.e. r   S. This
gives us a constraint which we term IJ Incentive Constraint 2, or IJ IC2. For equilibrium
11An example of an alternative, less intuitive rule that can sometimes achieve the same repayment rate
but cannot do better is where borrowers agree to repay their partner’s loan, and then repay their own as
well if they can a↵ord to do so.
11
interest rate rˆ = ⇢⇡IJ IJ IC2 reduces to:
⇢   ⇡IJS. (IJ IC2)
There is a threshold value of S, SˆIJ , such that IJ IC2 holds for S   SˆIJ :
SˆIJk ⌘
⇢
 ⇡IJk
, k 2 {A,B},
where k denotes the relevant case. When S   SˆIJ , it is feasible and incentive compatible for
borrowers to guarantee one another’s loans, and therefore they will do so as this increases
the repayment probability and thus joint welfare. Therefore borrowers always engage in IJ
if S   SˆIJ .
Next we work out the equilibrium repayment probabilities and interest rates in cases A
and B respectively. Assume S   SˆIJ . In Case A, a successful borrower can always a↵ord to
repay both loans, so both loans are repaid with probability ⇡IJA ⌘ 1   (1   p)2 = p(2   p).
In Case B, both loans are repaid whenever both are successful, and in states (Rh, 0), (0, Rh).
In state (Rm, 0), borrower 1 cannot a↵ord to repay borrower 2’s loan, so she repays her
own loan, while borrower 2 defaults and is replaced in the next period with a new partner.
Therefore ⇡IJB ⌘ p2 + 2ph(1  p) + pm(1  p) = p+ ph(1  p). Notice that both ⇡IJA and ⇡IJB
are greater than p, the IL repayment probability.
The lender observes whether Case A or Case B applies, and the value of S in the com-
munity, and o↵ers an individual liability contract at the appropriate zero profit interest rate.
Equilibrium borrower welfare under individual liability is equal to:
V ILk (S) =
8<:
R¯ ⇢
1  p S < Sˆ
IJ
k
R¯ ⇢
1  ⇡IJk
S   SˆIJk
, k 2 {A,B}.
It is straightforward to see that as S switches from less than SˆIJk to greater than or equal to
it, V ILk (S) goes up as ⇡
IJ
k > p.
2.2 Explicit Joint Liability
Now we analyze EJ contracts. Recall that under EJ, a pair of borrowers are o↵ered a contract
such that unless both loans are repaid, both partners lose access to credit in the future. The
advantage of this contractual form is that it gives additional incentives to the borrowers
to guarantee one another’s loans. However, the disadvantage is that when borrower i is
successful and j is unsuccessful, there may be states in which borrower i would repay were
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she under individual liability, but she will default under joint liability because she is either
unwilling or unable to repay both loans.
The borrowers will agree a repayment rule, just as under IJ. Since this will be chosen
to maximize joint welfare, it will only ever involve either both loans being repaid or both
defaulting, due to the joint liability clause that gives no incentive to repay only one loan.
Subject to this, because IC1 holds, joint welfare is maximized by ensuring both loans are
repaid as frequently as possible.
IC1 implies that when both borrowers are successful, they will both be willing to repay
their own loans. We therefore need to consider i’s incentive to repay both loans when j is
unsuccessful. Borrower i will be willing to make this loan guarantee payment provided the
threat of termination of her contract, plus the social sanction for failing to do so, exceeds
the cost of repaying two loans. Formally, this requires 2r   (V EJ + S). We refer to this
condition as EJ IC2. Rearranging, and substituting for rˆ = ⇢⇡EJ , we obtain:
⇢   ⇡
EJ [R¯ + (1   ⇡EJ)S]
2   ⇡EJ . (EJ IC2)
We can derive a threshold, SˆEJ , such that EJ IC2 is satisfied for S   SˆEJ :
SˆEJk ⌘ max
⇢
0,
⇢
 ⇡EJk
   ⇡
EJ
k R¯  ⇢
 ⇡EJk (1   ⇡EJk )
 
, k 2 {A,B}
where as before, k denotes the relevant Case.
Note that SˆEJ can be equal to zero. This corresponds to the basic case in Besley and
Coate (1995) where borrowers can be induced to guarantee one another even without any
social capital. This relies on the lender’s use of joint liability to give borrowers incentives to
help one another, and is not possible under individual liability.
Provided S   SˆEJ , borrowers are willing to guarantee one another’s repayments. The
repayment rule will then specify that i repays on j’s behalf whenever i can a↵ord to and j
is unsuccessful. If S < SˆEJ , borrowers will not guarantee one another. They will therefore
only repay when both are successful.
We now derive the equilibrium repayment probability under each Case. Firstly, if S <
SˆEJ , borrowers repay only when both are successful, so ⇡EJ = p2 in either Case.
Now suppose S   SˆEJ . In Case A, both loans can be repaid whenever at least one
borrower earns at least Rm. Thus the repayment probability is ⇡EJA = p(2   p). In Case
B, Rm is not su cient to repay both loans. Therefore both loans are repaid in all states
except (0, 0), (Rm, 0), (0, Rm). In these three states both borrowers default. The repayment
probability is therefore ⇡EJB = p
2 + 2ph(1  p) = p+4(1  p) (recall 4 ⌘ ph   pm).
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Borrower welfare is:
V EJk (S) =
8<:
R¯ ⇢
1  p2 S < Sˆ
EJ
k
R¯ ⇢
1  ⇡EJk
S   SˆEJk
, k 2 {A,B}.
Note that SˆEJA  SˆEJB . This is because the interest rate is lower in Case A, and V is
higher (due to the higher renewal probability), so the threat of termination is more potent.
Now that we have derived the equilibrium contracts assuming either IL or EJ, we turn to
analyzing the lender’s choice of contractual form in equilibrium, which will depend crucially
on the borrowers’ ability to guarantee one another’s loans.
Let us define V (S) ⌘ max{V EJ(S), V IL(S)} as the maximum borrower welfare from
access to credit. Observe that the repayment probability and borrower welfare from access
to credit, V (S), are stepwise increasing in S.
2.3 Comparing contracts
In this section we compare borrower welfare under each contractual form. We have seen that
EJ has the advantage that it may be able to induce borrowers to guarantee one another even
when they have no social capital. However, in Case B it has a perverse e↵ect: in some states
of the world borrowers will default when they would have repaid under IL.
This is most acute when pm > ph. Then ⇡EJB = p +4(1  p) < p. Therefore in Case B,
when 4  0, EJ actually performs worse than IL for all levels of social capital - the perverse
e↵ect dominates. Thus for Case B, when 4  0, EJ would never be o↵ered.
We have already derived thresholds for S, SˆIJ and SˆEJ , above which borrowers will
guarantee one another’s loans under individual and joint liability respectively. The lender’s
choice of contract will depend on the borrowers ability to do so, so first we derive a lemma
that orders these thresholds in Case A and Case B.
Lemma 1
1. SˆIJA > Sˆ
EJ
A .
2. Suppose ph   pm. Then SˆIJB > SˆEJB .
Proof. See appendix.
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Lemma 1 shows that supporting a loan guarantee arrangement requires more social cap-
ital under IL than under EJ. The reason for this is that the lender’s sanction under EJ is a
substitute for social capital in providing incentives to borrowers to guarantee one another.12
The lender is a non-profit who o↵ers the borrower welfare-maximizing contract. Therefore
he o↵ers IL if V EJ(S)  V IL(S) and EJ otherwise. This will depend on the Case (A or B),
the sign of 4, and S. We summarize the key result of this section as:
Proposition 1 The contracts o↵ered in equilibrium are as follows:
Case A: IL is o↵ered at rˆ = ⇢p for S < Sˆ
EJ
A , EJ is o↵ered at r =
⇢
⇡EJA
, for S 2 [SˆEJA , SˆIJA ),
otherwise either EJ or IL are o↵ered at r = ⇢
⇡EJA
= ⇢
⇡IJA
(the lender is indi↵erent).
Case B, 4 > 0: IL is o↵ered at rˆ = ⇢p for S < SˆEJA , EJ is o↵ered at rˆ = ⇢⇡EJB for
S 2 [SˆEJB , SˆIJB ), IL is o↵ered at rˆ = ⇢⇡IJB for S   Sˆ
IJ
B .
Case B, 4  0: IL is o↵ered at rˆ = ⇢p for S < SˆIJB , IL is o↵ered at rˆ = ⇢⇡IJB otherwise.
Whenever EJ is o↵ered borrowers guarantee one another’s repayments. Whenever IL is
o↵ered and S   SˆIJ borrowers guarantee one another’s repayments.
Proof. See appendix.
The result is summarized in Table 1, which gives the equilibrium contract and repayment
probability ⇡ in alternate rows. Borrower welfare is not shown, but is easily computed as
V = pR ⇢1  ⇡ , and is strictly increasing in ⇡.
Case A Case B, 4 > 0 Case B, 4  0
S < SˆEJ
IL (no IJ) IL (no IJ)
p p IL (no IJ)
S 2 [SˆEJ , SˆIJ) EJ EJ p
p(2  p) p+4(1  p)
S   SˆIJ EJ or IL (with IJ) IL (with IJ) IL (with IJ)
p(2  p) p+ ph(1  p) p+ ph(1  p)
Table 1: Equilibrium contracts and repayment probabilities
This table shows that there are clear trade-o↵s in the contractual choice. In Case A,
IJ has no advantage over EJ because in both cases borrowers repay both loans whenever
12A slight complication arises in the proof because in Case B the repayment probability is higher under
IJ, and therefore the interest payment is lower than under EJ. As a result, the size of the guarantee payment
that must be incentive compatible is actually smaller under IJ, but the net e↵ect is still that borrowers are
more willing to guarantee one another under EJ.
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successful. In Case B when 4  0, we have already remarked that EJ is always dominated
by IL. Therefore basic IL is o↵ered for low S, and when S is high enough, borrowers will
begin to guarantee one another, leading to an increase in the repayment rate and a fall in
the equilibrium interest rate.
The most interesting case is Case B for 4 > 0. Here there is a clear progression as
S increases. For low S, borrowers cannot guarantee one another under either contract, so
basic IL is o↵ered. For intermediate S, EJ can sustain a loan guarantee arrangement but
IL cannot, so EJ is o↵ered. Finally for high S, borrowers are able to guarantee one another
under IL as well. Since this avoids the perverse e↵ect of EJ, the lender switches back to IL
lending.
2.4 Microfoundations of social capital
So far we have treated S as a “black box” as is common in the literature. While the primary
goal of this paper is to demonstrate how social ties and social interactions can influence the
credit market, it is worthwhile to consider conceptualizations of social capital that would be
consistent with our setting.
We feel the most natural interpretation of S is as the net present value of lifetime payo↵s
in a repeated “social game” played alongside the borrowing relationship, similar to the
multi-market contact literature, such as Spagnolo (1999), who models agents interacting
simultaneously in a social and business context, using one to support cooperation in the
other.
Suppose that each period, before loans are disbursed, each pair of friends plays the stage-
game in Table 2 (presented in standard normal form), where s, c, d   0. Let S be the value
of playing (C,C) indefinitely, i.e. S ⌘ s1   . If d  s the stage-game has two Nash equilibria,
(C,C) and (D,D). If d > s then only (D,D) is a stage-game equilibrium, but (C,C) can
be sustained by trigger strategies in the repeated game if d <  s1   , which we assume. When
d  s the stage-game is a coordination game, whereby players can coordinate on either
equilibrium, while d > s is a standard prisoner’s dilemma. The fact that (D,D) is always
an equilibrium is what enables people to credibly threaten to destroy S in response to a
deviation, in this case to a deviation in either the social game or the repayment game.
C D
C s, s  c, d
D d, c 0, 0
Table 2: Social stage-game payo↵s
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We think of coordination games as a simple model of friendship. Individuals derive a
utility benefit s from socializing with their friends, it is costly to extend friendship if it is
not reciprocated (c   0), but it is not advantageous not to reciprocate (d < s). To us, this
is the most natural way to think about social capital, essentially borrowers help one another
in their borrowing a↵airs because something bigger is at stake, their social relationships.
The prisoner’s dilemma representation can represent, for example, a public goods game.
Each partner contributes something to a public good, for example keeping the street in
their neighborhood clean, keeping noise down, abiding by social norms, acting honestly in
economic transactions. Each is tempted to deviate and not contribute (because d > s) but
does so to preserve the continuation value  S.
A third motivation is that perhaps borrowers have other insurance arrangements behind
the scenes, and help one another in loan repayment to preserve those. For example, suppose
that with probability ⌧ a borrower su↵ers a non-monetary shock z, such as a health shock.
One person in the village is especially well-positioned to assist with that (so the cost z
is not incurred), at a cost to that person of c < z, provided they did not su↵er a shock
themselves. For instance they could provide childcare, take the person to the hospital, take
over their business for a day, and so on. Assume the setup is symmetric, then the expected
per-period utility under a reciprocal arrangement to help one another is  (1   ⌧)⌧c   ⌧ 2z.
Without an arrangement, the utility is  ⌧z, so the per-period gain from the agreement is
⌧(1  ⌧)(z  c) > 0 and the lifetime value is S ⌘ ⌧(1 ⌧)(z c)1   . Suppose that individuals believe
that a partner who has always helped in the past (when able) will always help in the future,
but one who has ever deviated will never help again. Then it is clear that they will help
when able if c <  S provided the partner is expected to always help in the future. If the
partner is not expected to help in the future, they too will not help today. This provides a
stochastic foundation for S closely related to the social game outlined here.
Finally, we comment on three other interesting features of this setup, that we do not
analyze in detail for brevity. The first is that, depending on a timing assumption, the social
capital generated in the social game may be useless for guaranteeing microfinance loans.
Suppose that first incomes are realized, then the social game is played, then the repayment
game is played. If d is large enough, a borrower whose partner was unsuccessful will prefer to
first play D in the social game then refuse to bail out her partner. Consider IJ for instance.
Now, her incentive constraint (IC2) is  S   d+r, since she gains d by deviating in the social
game and saves r by refusing to help her partner. Of course the partner will anticipate this
and also play D in the social game, hence the arrangement unravels. These borrowers will
not write a repayment rule conditioning on S, because it will not be incentive compatible.
One way to think about this issue is that the time period between learning one’s partner
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cannot repay and the repayment meeting cannot be too long.
Second, lending can actually create temporary social capital (this bootstrap argument is
very similar to the points made in Spagnolo, 1999). Suppose d >  S, so the only equilibrium
in the repeated social game is (D,D) forever. However, suppose the individuals agree to
guarantee one another’s loans, and to play (C,C) until someone deviates.13 Now, refusing to
repay the partner’s loan when required leads to a loss of social capital, this may be enough
to sustain mutual insurance in the lending arrangement. Deviating in the social game also
destroys social capital, and this renders mutual insurance in the repayment game impossible,
leading to a decrease in the repayment rate and thus a fall in V . This additional cost may be
su cient to sustain cooperation in the social game.14 We choose not to emphasize this point
because we are primarily interested in social capital creation induced by the group structure
rather than by lending itself.
Third, a comment on the friendship motivation. Throughout, we consider S to be the
amount of social capital that can credibly be destroyed. One could think that with close
friends or family members, the payo↵ structure is such that (D,D) is not an equilibrium,
and for this reason destroying S is not a credible threat. Mutual insurance (based on such
threats) may be less possible in these circumstances. This may be one motivation for why
MFIs commonly restrict family members from joining the same joint liability groups.
Finally, throughout we assume that borrowers have a large number of friends (or, in the
discussion of social capital creation, a large number of potential friends), and that after loss
of S with one friend they can simply form a group with another. In many cases this may not
be a plausible assumption. One could also think of S as a reputation value that is lost once
and for all. The “many friends” assumption is by no means crucial but it greatly simplifies
the analysis, because it enables us to make the repayment problem stationary. Otherwise,
loss of S would change the continuation value in the borrowing relationship as well as the
social relationship.
2.5 A remark on loan size
For simplicity, our core model assumes loans of a fixed size. However, it is interesting to
consider what happens as loan sizes grow.
13Note that by the assumption d >  S the social capital created will be dissolved once the lending
relationship ends, so S will be worth s1  ⇡both <
s
1   where ⇡both is the probability that both loans are
repaid.
14This argument has one theoretically interesting implication. Suppose that if the lender charges a low
interest rate r and o↵ers EJ, the joint liability penalty is enough to induce borrowers to guarantee one
another. If the lender increases the interest rate to r0, they require social capital to achieve this. As a result,
increases in the interest rate can lead to more social capital creation.
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In our view, it is likely to be the case that e cient loan sizes, as determined by the
production function, grow faster than social capital. For example, industrialization leads
to increases in start-up costs relative to subsistence farming, while development may bring
market or contract-based alternatives to social capital such as favor exchange, informal
insurance or even, regretfully, traditional notions of friendship. Such developments imply a
shift away from EJ and IJ, toward pure IL. To see this, note that the interest payment, r, is
proportional to the loan size, so as loan sizes grow relative to S, the IC2 constraints tighten,
decreasing the value of EJ. To the extent that groups are used to foster IJ (see below), it
also implies a shift away from group lending.
Thus, our model is consistent with a stylized fact that can be seen in, for example, the
well-known MIX Market microfinance dataset: loans disbursed to individuals tend to be
larger than loans disbursed to groups. The model suggests a causal link from the loan size
to the disbursement method.15
2.6 Discussion
Borrowers form partnerships that optimally leverage their social capital to maximize their
joint repayment probability. Thus when social capital is su ciently high to generate implicit
joint liability, IL lending can dominate EJ: borrower i no longer defaults in state (Rm, 0).
This does not however mean there is no role for EJ. In particular, for intermediate levels of
social capital, EJ can dominate IL - social capital is high enough for repayment guarantees
under EJ but not under IL. We analyze borrower welfare under EJ and IL/IJ quantitatively
in the simulations.
Let us compare our theoretical results with the findings of Gine´ and Karlan (2014),
namely, average repayment does not change significantly when there is a random switch
from EJ to IL. However, borrowers with stronger social ties are less likely to default relative
to those with weaker social ties after switching to IL lending, and that these two e↵ects
average out to zero.
If we look at Case A, Case B (4 > 0), and Case B (4  0), in all these three cases,
for low S, IL (no IJ) dominates EJ (though it should be noted that SˆEJ could be negative
depending on parameter values, in which case calling this case that of “low S” would not
make sense). We can see that in all these three cases, for high values of S (S   SˆIJ), IJ
(weakly) dominates EJ. For Case A, they achieve the same repayment rate, but in the other
two cases IJ achieves a strictly higher repayment rate. In contrast, with medium values of S,
EJ strictly dominates IL (no IJ) in Case A and Case B (4 > 0), but not in Case B (4  0).
15Baland et al. (2013) analyze this particular mechanism in detail, also relating loan sizes to borrower
wealth.
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Therefore for “medium” levels of S, EJ is likely to dominate IL, unless the parameters of
the distribution of returns are such that EJ is never desirable.
In the theoretical model, the optimal lending arrangment is always chosen. But in a
randomized experiment, it is chosen randomly, including when it is not optimal. Clearly,
Case B (4  0) is not consistent with either of the two findings of Gine´ and Karlan (2014).
There, a random switch to IL should have raised repayment rates unconditionally. Case A
is consistent with the average repayment rates being the same, but not the fact borrowers
with stronger social ties are less likely to default relative to those with weaker social ties
after switching to IL. Only Case B is consistent with both facts.
So far, we have ignored the use of groups for disbursal and repayment of loans. However,
it is frequently argued (see e.g. Armenda´riz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010) that group
meetings generate costs that di↵er from those under individual repayment. In the next
section we show that this may induce the lender to prefer one or the other. We then proceed
to show that by interacting with the benefits from social capital, group meetings may induce
the creation of social capital. This is consistent with the results of a field experiment by
Feigenberg et al. (2013).
3 Meeting Costs
In this section we lay out a simple model of loan repayment meeting costs. This immediately
suggests a motivation for the use of groups. Holding group repayment meetings shifts the
burden of meeting costs from the lender to the borrowers. This enables the lender to reduce
the interest rate, which in turn makes it easier for borrowers to guarantee one another. Then
in the next section we explore how the use of groups might create social capital, and thus
generate implicit joint liability.
Since we want to focus on the interplay between meeting costs and social capital under
individual liability, we assume that Case B applies and 4  0. Therefore we can ignore EJ
and drop the A,B notation.
A common justification for the use of group meetings by lenders is that it minimizes
transaction costs. Meeting with several borrowers simultaneously is less time-consuming
than meeting with each individually. However, group meetings might be costly for the
borrowers, as they take longer and are less convenient than individual meetings. We term
IL lending to groups ILG and IL lending to individuals ILI.
We assume that loan repayment meetings have two components, each of which takes
a fixed amount of time. For simplicity, we assume that the value of time is the same for
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borrowers and loan o cers16 Also, for simplicity, we assume that the cost of borrower time is
non-monetary so that borrowers are able to attend the meeting even if they have no income.
However, more time spent in meetings by the loan o cer increases monetary lending costs,
for example because more sta↵ must be hired.
Each meeting incurs a fixed and variable cost. The fixed cost includes travel to the meet-
ing location (which we assume to be the same for borrower and loan o cer for simplicity),
setting up the meeting, any discussions or advice sessions that take place at the meeting,
reminding borrowers of the MFI’s policies, and so on. This costs each borrower and the loan
o cer an amount of time worth  f irrespective of the number of borrowers in the group.
Secondly there is a variable cost that depends on the number of borrowers at the meeting.
This time cost is worth  v per borrower in the meeting. This covers tasks that must be
carried out once for each borrower: collecting and recording repayments and attendance,
reporting back on productive activities, rounding up missing borrowers, and so on. As with
the fixed cost, each borrower and the loan o cer incurs the variable cost. We assume that
for group loans, each borrower also has to incur the cost having to sit through the one-to-one
discussion between the loan o cer and the other borrower, i.e., in a two group setting, the
total variable cost per borrower is 2 v whereas under individual lending, it is  v.
Therefore, in a meeting with one borrower, the total cost incurred by the loan o cer is
 f + v, and the total cost incurred by the borrower is the same, bringing the aggregate total
time cost of the meeting to 2 f + 2 v. In a meeting with two borrowers the loan o cer
incurs a cost of  f + 2 v, and similarly for the borrowers. Thus the aggregate cost in this
case is 3 f +6 v. The lender’s cost of lending per loan under ILI is ⇢+  f +  v. Under ILG
it is ⇢ +
 f
2 +  v. Therefore the corresponding zero-profit interest rates are rˆ
ILI ⌘ ⇢+ f+ v⇡
and rˆILG ⌘ ⇢+
 f
2 + v
⇡ .
Accounting for these costs, per-period expected utility for borrowers under ILI is R¯ ⇢ 
2( f +  v). Under ILG, the per-period utility is R¯  ⇢  32( f + 2 v).17
Of course, the first thing to check is whether one lending method is less costly than the
other in the absence of any loan guarantee arrangement between borrowers. This is covered
by the following observation:
16This may not be too unrealistic. For example, the large Indian MFI, Bandhan, deliberately hires loan
o cers from the communities that they lend to.
17We need to adapt Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 to reflect the additional costs. We assume Rm   ⇢+
1
2 ( f+2 v)
p2 ,
Rh   2⇢+
1
2 ( f+2 v)
p2 ,  p
2R¯   max (1 +  p2)( f +  v),   12 +  p2  ( f + 2 v)   ⇢. Notice the implicit sim-
plifying assumption that borrowers must attend the meeting even if they are not repaying. This greatly
simplifies the analysis without losing much of the economic intuition, because it ensures that the per-period
payo↵ does not depend upon the probability of repayment; without this assumption the borrowers incur the
meeting cost with probability ⇡.
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Observation 1 Suppose S = 0. The lender uses ILG if and only if  v <
 f
2 .
18
The intuition is straightforward. When
 f
 v
is large, i.e., fixed costs are important relative
variable costs (e.g., when a large part of repayment meetings is repetitious) it is economical
to hold group meetings. However, the more time is spent on individual concerns, the more
costly it is to the borrowers to have to attend repayment meetings in groups because they
have to sit through all the bilateral exchanges between another borrower and the loan o cer.
Microfinance loans are typically highly standardized and so
 f
 v
will be relatively large, which
is consistent with the common usage of group lending methods in microfinance.
Now consider borrowers’ incentives to guarantee one another’s loans. First we observe
that for a given  v,  f , half of the aggregate meeting cost per borrower is borne by the lender
under ILI, while only a third is borne by the lender under ILG. The lender passes on all costs
through the interest rate, so inspecting the value functions suggests that it is innocuous upon
whom the cost of meetings falls. In fact this is not the case. Consider once again IJ IC2:
r   S. The only benefit a borrower receives from bailing out her partner is the avoidance of
a social sanction, while the cost depends on the interest payment she must make. Therefore
a lending arrangement in which the lender bears a greater share of the costs, and thus must
charge a higher interest rate, tightens IJ IC2. This gives us the next proposition, which is
straightforward:
Proposition 2 Borrowers are more likely to engage in IJ under group lending than indi-
vidual lending: SˆIJG < SˆIJI .19
The implication of this result is that there is a trade-o↵ between minimizing total meeting
costs, and minimizing those costs borne by the lender. It may actually not be optimal to
minimize total costs as shown by the following corollary, the proof of which is straightforward
and given in the appendix.
Corollary 1 Suppose S 2 [SˆIJG, SˆIJI). Borrower welfare under ILG may be higher than
under ILI, even if  v >
 f
2 .
It is worth pointing out that as in the earlier analysis of IJ, nothing in the results presented
so far requires IL borrowers to form insurance arrangements with their own group members.
In the next section we analyze the interaction between meeting costs, insurance initiation
and social capital creation, which will more naturally lead to insurance arrangements forming
within group boundaries.
18Proof: S = 0 implies IJ is not possible so ⇡ = p under ILI and ILG. The result then follows from
comparison of per-period borrower welfare.
19Proof: Borrowers are willing to guarantee their partner’s repayments provided r   S. Plugging in for
the interest rates under ILG and ILI, we obtain SˆIJG =
⇢+ 12 ( f+2 v)
 ⇡IJ <
⇢+ f+ v
 ⇡IJ = Sˆ
IJI .
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4 The role of groups
In this section we show how group lending can facilitate mutual insurance among borrowers
where individual lending cannot. For example, groups may generate social capital that is
then used to sustain IJ. The analysis is motivated by the findings of Feigenberg et al. (2013).
In their experiment, borrowers who were randomly assigned to higher frequency repayment
meetings went on to achieve higher repayment rates. The authors attribute this to social
capital being created by frequent meetings, social capital which can then support mutual
insurance.
We think there are two broad classes of mechanism by which meetings can increase
repayment rates. The first is that forcing borrowers to interact frequently, the lender can
increase their incentive to invest in social capital. Intuitively, the more time I spend with
someone, the greater the benefit to forming a social bond with that person. This is our
interpretation of the Feigenberg et al. (2013) findings. The second is that meetings play
a more mechanical role in facilitating mutual insurance. This could be because borrowers
need to observe one another’s outcomes or repayments, or play a message game as in Rai and
Sjo¨stro¨m (2010). It could be that meetings help borrowers coordinate on mutual insurance
which is too di cult to arrange independently.20
We model each of these in turn. On the first, we assume that investing in social capital
is costly, such that borrowers do not do it independently. The situation we have in mind is
that borrowers have some baseline level of social capital created in the normal run of life,
but this is insu cient to sustain mutual insurance in borrowing without an extra incentive
to create more. Borrowing groups increase the return to investment in social capital by
providing an added benefit: social time spent with the partner. We also discuss informally
under what conditions a simpler mechanism–spending time together automatically generates
social capital–can have the same e↵ect.
Turning to the second, we assume that sustaining mutual insurance requires borrowers
to spend a minimum amount of time with another borrower (their insurance partner) each
period. This is perfectly possible under individual lending, but groups have an advantage in
that the group meeting time can serve this purpose.
In both frameworks we discuss the welfare consequences of increasing the length of group
meetings, which we treat as a simple proxy for the repayment frequency in Feigenberg et al.
20It could even be that without the group, borrowers would be less able to interact. Indeed, in some
conservative societies, social norms may prevent women from attending social gatherings (for instance under
the Purdah customs in some parts of India and the Middle East). Then externally mandated borrowing
groups can be a valuable vehicle for social interaction. See, for instance Sanyal (2009), Anderson et al.
(2002), Kabeer (2005).
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(2013). We take this approach because changing repayment frequency is non-trivial in our
setup.21
4.1 Groups and social capital creation
Suppose that initially borrowers do not have any social capital, because creating social capital
is too costly. For example, borrowers must invest time and e↵ort in getting to know and
understand one another, extend trust that might not be reciprocated, and so forth. Assume
that social capital can take two values only, 0 and S > 0 and for a pair to generate social
capital worth S in utility terms, each must make a discrete non-monetary investment that
costs them ⌘. In the absence of microfinance, they prefer not to do so, i.e., ⌘ > S. In
the context of the discussion in section 2.4, ⌘ represents an up-front cost in initiating a
friendship, favor exchange arrangement, etc.
Once lending is taking place, social capital generates an indirect benefit, by enabling the
formation of a guarantee arrangement. This may or may not be su cient to induce them
to make the investment - that would depend on how ⌘   S compares with the insurance
gains from microfinance. We also assume that group meetings confer an additional benefit,
namely that spending time in a group meeting with a partner with whom one shares social
capital is less arduous than with a stranger. Naturally this increases the incentive to invest
in social capital when groups are used.
To make the point as simply as possible, we assume that the lender can observe whether
borrowers have invested in S and adjust the interest rate accordingly to reflect the repayment
probability. This of course increases the incentive to invest in S because that leads to an
interest rate cut, however it greatly simplifies the analysis while preserving the main point.22
Suppose the lender o↵ers ILI and S would be su ciently large to sustain IJ. If the
borrowers prefer to invest in social capital, each time their partner defaults they must invest
in social capital with their new partner. We obtain the following result:
Lemma 2 Borrowers invest in social capital under ILI if and only if:
⌘   S  G1. (3)
where
G1 ⌘
 ph(1  p)
⇥
R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v)
⇤
(1   p)(1   (p+4(1  p))) .
21In a companion paper, Feigenberg et al. (2014) discuss a treatment that comes closer to our setup:
increasing the meeting frequency without changing the repayment frequency.
22We thank a thoughtful referee for suggesting this approach. The working paper version of the paper
analyzes the more complicated case in which the interest rate does not adjust.
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The proof is given in the appendix. The greater the welfare gain from insurance, captured
by the ratio ph(1  p)/(1   p), the higher is G1 so the more likely the borrowers will invest
in social capital.
Now assume that under ILG, the per-meeting cost to borrowers is decreasing in S. For
simplicity, we assume that the cost to the borrowers of the time spent in group meetings is
(1   (S))( f +2 v). In particular,  (0) = 0 and  (S) =   > 0. The larger is  , the smaller
the disutility of group meetings, and when   > 1, borrowers actually derive positive utility
from group meetings that is increasing in the length of the meeting. We can now check when
social capital will be created in groups.
Lemma 3 Borrowers invest in social capital under ILG if:
⌘   S  G2. (4)
where
G2 ⌘
 ph(1  p)
⇥
R¯  ⇢  32( f + 2 v)
⇤
+  (1   p)( f + 2 v)
(1   p)(1   (p+4(1  p))) .
The proof is given in the appendix. The greater the welfare gain from insurance, the
higher is G2, but in addition, G2 is increasing in  , which represents the reduction in the
cost of attending group meetings when the borrowers have social capital. The larger is G2,
the more likely borrowers are to invest in social capital.
Lemmas 2 and 3 suggest that there may exist an interval, (G1, G2] for ⌘   S over which
groups create social capital but individual borrowers do not. The condition for this to be
the case is derived in the next proposition, which follows from straightforward comparison
of (3) and (4):
Proposition 3 If the following condition holds:
  >
 ph(1  p)( v    f2 )
(1   p)( f + 2 v)
(5)
then there exists a non-empty interval for ⌘ S over which both (3) and (4) are satisfied. If
⌘   S lies in this interval, groups create social capital, and individual lending does not.
Thus, when creating social capital su ciently o↵sets the cost to borrowers of attending
group meetings, borrowing groups may create social capital and guarantee one another’s
loans, while individual borrowers may not do so. We can see that the threshold for   in (5)
is negative if
 f
2 >  v and so the condition (5) is always satisfied if group lending has a cost
advantage to the lender. Even if this is not the case, and  v   f2 > 0 the critical threshold for
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  is always strictly less than 1 and therefore, there always exists a   high enough (but strictly
less than 1) such that the condition (5) would hold. However it does not yet establish that
the use of groups is necessarily welfare-improving. In other words, observing that groups
are bonding and creating social capital does not tell the observer that group lending is the
welfare-maximizing lending methodology. All it tells us is that investment is preferred to no
investment under ILG, and no investment is preferred to investment under ILI. The welfare
ranking of these two will depend on the meeting costs, ⌘ and S. The following proposition
addresses the welfare question.
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (5) is satisfied and ⌘   S 2 (G1, G2]. Borrower welfare
under ILG is higher than that under ILI if:
⌘   S  G3 (6)
where
G3 ⌘
 ph(1  p)
 
R¯  ⇢ + 2(1   ⇡IJ)( f +  v)  12(1   p)( f + 2 v)(3  2 )
(1   p)(1   (p+4(1  p))) .
The derivation simply compares welfare under ILI when borrowers do not invest to welfare
under ILG when they do. G3 is higher the larger is the meeting cost under ILI relative to
under ILG. It is also increasing in  , representing the reduction in the cost of attending
group meetings when the borrowers have social capital. (6) is always satisfied provided
group meeting costs are low enough and   is high enough.
We conclude this analysis with an observation that combines the above results. If meeting
costs are lower under group lending then it dominates individual lending both from an
e ciency and a social capital creation perspective.
Observation 2 Suppose   > 0 and total meeting costs per borrower are weakly lower under
ILG than ILI, i.e.  v   f2 . Then G1 < G2 < G3, i.e.:
1. There always exists an interval for ⌘   S over which groups create social capital and
individuals do not.
2. Borrower welfare is weakly higher under ILG than ILI for all values of ⌘   S.
The strict ordering also holds for   = 0 if  v <
 f
2 .
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4.1.1 Meeting frequency and social capital creation
Now we take this basic framework and carry out one particular comparative-static exercise,
motivated by the findings of Feigenberg et al. (2013). They find that groups that were
randomly assigned to meet more frequently have better long-run repayment performance,
which they attribute to higher social capital and informal insurance within the group. It is
not possible to model repayment frequency in our simple setup, but nevertheless our model
is able to capture some of this intuition.
We model an increase in meeting frequency as an increase in meeting costs, represented
by an increase in either  f or  v. The more time spent in group meetings, the greater the
benefit from social interaction within those meetings, captured by  . Intuitively, it may not
be too costly to attend meetings once a month with a stranger, but the more frequent those
meetings are, the greater the incentive the borrowers have to build social capital.
However, more frequent meetings require more of the loan o cer’s time as well, leading
to higher lending costs and a higher interest rate. This reduces the borrowers’ incentive to
invest in S, since the higher meeting costs reduce the value of maintaining access to credit.
The net e↵ect on borrowers willingness to invest in S is positive if   is su ciently large,
as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Increases in  f or  v make borrowers under group lending more willing to
invest in social capital if and only if the following condition holds:
  >
3 ph(1  p)
2(1   p) . (7)
The proof is immediate from inspection of (4). This proposition suggests that an increase
in meeting costs could actually be welfare-improving. Notice that the right hand side of (7)
is strictly smaller than 32 , and note too that if     32 then the utility of meeting with one’s
partner more than o↵sets the welfare cost of time in meetings, such that increase in meeting
time strictly increase borrower welfare.
However, under the more realistic assumption that   < 32 , increasing meeting costs is
welfare-decreasing, even if it leads borrowers to invest in S and generate insurance. The
reason is that the condition for borrowers to create S, (4) reduces to a simple comparison
between the value of credit under an always-invest and a never-invest regime, with borrowers
receiving the maximum of these two. When   < 32 payo↵s under either regime are strictly
decreasing in  f and  v, so increasing meeting times decreases welfare. The intuition is
straightforward: since borrowers are optimally deciding whether to invest in social capital,
their welfare cannot be increased by adding additional costs, even if doing so changes their
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choice. Feigenberg et al. (2013)’s intervention may not have been welfare improving.23 To
obtain a welfare increase, one must add a friction such as a coordination failure between
borrowers (leading them to fail to invest optimally), or an externality. For example, if the
lender’s break-even constraint is su ciently tight that he must exit the market if borrowers
do not mutually insure, but borrowers do not internalize this cost because there are many of
them, interventions that push borrowers into investing in S could enable the lender to stay
in business, increasing welfare.
Observation 3 Suppose   < 32 . Then increases in meeting costs are welfare decreasing,
even if they generate social capital creation and mutual insurance.
4.1.2 Mechanical social capital creation
An alternative possibility is that groups mechanically create social capital simply by spending
time together. Perhaps surprisingly it turns out that this mechanism cannot sustain IJ.
Suppose that each time a borrower obtains a new partner, automatically S is created between
them. Can they use this social capital to insure one another? The answer is no, as can be
seen by considering their modified IJ IC2. If a borrower repays on behalf of her unsuccessful
partner, she keeps her S at cost r. If she does not, she receives a new partner and new S
next period. Thus her incentive constraint is  (V + S)   r    (V + S) which cannot hold
for positive r. Mutual insurance requires a cost to deviating. One way to restore this is to
assume that it takes time for social capital to be generated, which decreases the right hand
side of the condition (V is lower because mutual insurance is not possible until new S is
generated). The analysis above can capture this mechanism in a simple reduced form way
via the cost of social capital formation, ⌘.
4.1.3 Meetings lower the cost of investment
An alternative way to use our framework is as follows. Assume that there are no direct
benefits to having social capital in group meetings (  = 0), but that group meetings lower the
cost of investment in social capital or the cost of setting up mutual insurance (⌘ILG < ⌘ILI).
Then, naturally, group meetings will lead to more insurance.
23A thoughtful referee pointed out that their intervention (increasing meeting frequency) was temporary,
which weakens but does not eliminate the incentive to invest in S. Could a temporary intervention be welfare
improving? Since borrowers are optimally investing in S, the answer is, again, no in this framework.
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4.2 Meetings facilitate insurance
Suppose that borrowers have social capital, but mutual insurance requires borrowers to spend
regular time together, for example to observe one another’s income and repayments. This
can either be held during a borrowing group meeting at zero additional cost or, if there
is no group meeting, independently at cost  i. Under ILG, borrowers are able to sustain
insurance, and their utility is:
V ILGins =
R¯  ⇢  32( f + 2 v)
1   ⇡IJ
IJ IC2 in this case is  S   ⇢+
 f
2 + v
⇡IJ .
Under ILI, borrowers can choose not to hold insurance meetings, in which case their
utility is
V ILIaut =
R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v)
1   p
or they can hold additional insurance meetings, enabling them to sustain insurance, earning
utility equal to
V ILIins =
R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v)   i
1   ⇡IJ
IC2 in this case is  S   ⇢+ f+ v⇡IJ .
ILI borrowers will choose not to hold insurance meetings if V ILIaut > V
ILI
ins or:
 i >
 ph(1  p)(R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v))
1   p . (8)
If (8) holds then ILG generates mutual insurance and ILI does not. ILG is e cient if
V ILGins > V
ILI
aut . If (8) does not hold then both generate insurance and ILG is e cient if
V ILGins > V
ILI
ins . Both inequalities are strict if  v   f2 , but both can be satisfied even if
this condition does not hold, because group lending either increases the repayment rate or
economizes on independent meeting costs ( i).
Now suppose that the total time required for insurance is  i but the group meetings take
only  f + 2 v <  i. Should the lender increase the length of the group meeting, or leave
it to the borrowers to independently spend the additional time? The answer is that the
lender should not lengthen the meetings. To see this, suppose the borrowers simply spend
an additional  i    f   2 v independently after the meeting. Then their utility becomes:
V ILGbor =
R¯  ⇢  12( f + 2 v)   i
1   ⇡IJ
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while IC2 remains unchanged. They will choose to do so if V ILGbor > V
ILG
aut where V
ILG
aut =
R¯ ⇢  32 ( f+2 v)
1  p or:
 i <
 ph(1  p)(R¯  ⇢  32( f + 2 v))
1   p +  f + 2 v (9)
Suppose instead the lender adds  i    f   2 v to the length of the meeting. Then the
lender’s meeting costs increase to  i per borrower, which is passed on through the interest
rate. Borrower welfare becomes:
V ILGlen =
R¯  ⇢  32 i
1   ⇡IJ < V
ILG
bor .
Moreover, IC2 tightens, becoming:  S   ⇢+ i⇡IJ , so it is possible that mutual insurance is no
longer possible at all.
We can go one step further. Suppose that (9) does not hold, so that borrowers do not
voluntarily hold insurance meetings, and suppose also that  S   ⇢+ i⇡IJ such that if the lender
were to lengthen the meetings, borrowers would insure one another. Is it e cient to do so?
The answer is clearly no, since we know that V ILGaut > V
ILG
bor > V
ILG
len .
Intuitively, the argument is as follows. If mutual insurance of microfinance loans requires
borrowers to spend time with one another, it may be e cient to use group meetings since
this “kills two birds with one stone,” the group meeting time does the job. However, any
additional time required should be arranged independently by the borrowers, it is not e cient
to artificially lengthen the group meetings for this purpose. This is because it uses up the
lender’s time, which must be compensated through a higher interest rate that both decreases
borrower welfare and tightens their incentive compatibility constraint. As in the previous
section, holding group meetings can be e cient, but increasing meeting time (or meeting
frequency) is not, even if it increases mutual insurance between the borrowers. An additional
friction is required for this intervention to be welfare increasing.
5 Simulation
In this section, we simulate a simple extension of the model calibrated to empirically es-
timated parameters. This enables us to illustrate the costs and benefits of explicit joint
liability and explore under which environments it will be dominated by individual liability
lending that induces implicit joint liability.
We find that in low social capital environments, EJ does quite well compared to IJ. For
example, when the standard deviation of project returns is half of the loan size, for social
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capital worth 10% of the loan size, the welfare attainable under IJ is 32.4% lower compared
than the welfare under EJ. However, with social capital worth 50% of the loan size, the
welfare attainable under EJ is 5% lower than under IJ. For social capital worth around
30% of the loan size, EJ and IJ perform approximately equally well in terms of borrower
welfare. This analysis thus gives us insights into the extent of the perverse e↵ect of EJ.
With high enough social capital under IJ, the borrowers now have enough social capital to
help one another when they can a↵ord to do so, but are not penalized in states of the world
where only some of the group can repay. We also find that the interest rate, repayment
rate and borrower welfare are highly insensitive to social capital under EJ, whereas IJ is
highly sensitive to social capital. Intuitively, this is because under EJ mutual insurance is
motivated both by the lender’s sanctions and social sanctions, while under IJ it depends only
on social sanctions. For example, when the standard deviation of project returns is half of
the loan size, the EJ net interest rate is 11.3% (and barely changes as we vary S), while the
IJ net interest rate ranges between 10.4% and 21.4% for levels of S valued at 10% to 50% of
the loan size respectively. The di↵erence in the interest rate translates correspondingly into
borrower welfare. If borrowers share social capital worth 10% of the loan size, the attainable
IJ welfare is V IJ = 2.29 (valued in units of the loan size), which is 35.9% lower than the
V IJ = 3.57 attained by borrowers who share social capital worth 50% of the loan size. We
also find that the welfare and interest rate di↵erences between low and high levels of social
capital S are increasing in the variance of project returns.
From theory we know the basic trade o↵ between EJ, Il and IJ and how that changes with
social capital. What this analysis adds is to give a quantitative magnitude to the relevant
thresholds and also suggests some policy implications. In low social capital environments,
despite its well known costs (Besley and Coate, 1995) EJ is an e↵ective device to induce
repayment incentives and moreover it is robust to uncertainty about the level of social capital.
The analysis also suggests there are significant welfare gains to be had from investment in
social capital when lenders are using individual liability lending.
5.1 Approach
We approach the simulations in a very similar way to de Quidt et al. (2013). First, while it
is theoretically convenient to model groups of size two, these require empirically implausibly
high returns to investment for the borrowers to be able to repay on one another’s behalf, so
instead we extend the model to groups of size 5, the group size originally used by Grameen
Bank and others. That is, under EJ, we assume five borrowers jointly liable for five loans.
Under IL we assume that borrowers are liable for one loan, but if they so choose they can
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form insurance arrangements in groups of five. As in the theoretical analysis we abstract
from issues of optimal group size (see e.g. Baland et al., 2013). We assume a fixed loan size,
normalized to 1, which we use as the numeraire throughout. We assume a loan term of 12
months.
Social capital was previously defined between pairs of borrowers. In larger groups it will
be e cient for all members of the borrowing group to threaten social sanctions against a
borrower who deviates from the agreed repayment rule (recall that the repayment rule is
set optimally so sanctions do not occur on the equilibrium path), since this maximizes the
achievable repayment probability. To maintain consistency with the theoretical discussion,
we use S to represent the total social capital that a deviating borrower stands to lose, i.e. we
assume that each borrower shares social capital worth S/4 with each other borrower, such
that the total sanction for a deviation is equal to S. For example, if S = 0.2 this means
the group has social capital worth 20% of the loan size (i.e. each pair within the group has
social capital worth 5% of the loan size).
We obtain our parameter values from de Quidt et al. (2013). R¯, the expected return
to borrowers’ investments, is set to 1.6, i.e. a 60% annual return, based on De Mel et al.
(2008)’s preferred estimates of the rate of return to capital among microenterprises in Sri
Lanka. The lender’s cost of capital, ⇢, is set to 1.098, which was estimated using lender cost
data from the MIX Market database of financial information from MFIs around the world.
Lastly, we set   equal to 0.864. This is the midpoint between the value implied by the return
on US treasury bills and a lower bound, based on IC1, estimated from the MIX data by
de Quidt et al. (2013). In the appendix we show robustness to   = 0.95.
The two key ingredients that drive the trade-o↵ between explicit and implicit joint liability
are the level of social capital and the shape of the borrowers’ return distribution function.
We do not have data on social capital, so instead we estimate the equilibrium interest rate,
repayment rate and welfare for a range of values for S. This enables us to say, for example,
how much social capital is required for implicit joint liability to perform as well or better
than explicit joint liability.
It is more di cult to explore how the shape of the returns distribution a↵ects the trade-
o↵ between EJ and IJ. In the theoretical analysis it was convenient to illustrate the key
intuition using a simple categorical distribution with three output values and associated
discrete probabilities. With larger groups, this distribution function is less useful. It no
longer gives a simple and intuitive set of states of the world in which EJ does and does
not perform well (with a group of size n, there are 3n possible states of the world). More
problematic is that the distribution has four parameters (pm, Rm, ph, Rh), only one of which
can be tied down by our calibrated value of R¯. As a result, it is very di cult to perform
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meaningful comparative statics - there are too many degrees of freedom.24
Therefore, for the main simulations we use the most obvious two-parameter distribution
function, the Normal distribution.25 Fixing the mean at R¯, we can vary the shape of the
distribution by changing the standard deviation. The range for   was chosen to obtain the
highest and lowest possible repayment rates at which the lender is able to break even. For
the benchmark simulations, we assume the borrowers’ returns are uncorrelated, but we also
allow for positive and negative correlations in an extension.
To simulate the model, for each contract we work out a welfare-maximizing repayment
rule for the borrowing group, i.e. one that maximizes the repayment rate, subject to the
borrowers’ incentive constraints. Solving analytically for the equilibrium repayment prob-
ability (which then gives us the interest rate and borrower welfare) is complex, so instead
we simulate a large number of hypothetical borrowing groups and use these to compute
the equilibrium repayment probability. We describe the simulation approach in detail in
Appendix B.
5.2 Results
The main results for uncorrelated borrower incomes are presented in Figure 1. The standard
deviation   of individual borrower returns is varied on the horizontal axis of each figure.
For the distribution and parameter values used, it turns out that individual liability is
in fact marginally loss-making for all  , so we just present results for implicit joint liability
and explicit joint liability for values S 2 {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}.
The figures show that increasing the variance of returns is bad for repayment and thus
welfare under both contracts. This is unsurprising: higher variance income processes are
more di cult to insure (the required transfers between members tend to be larger), so states
in which members cannot or will not help one another out become more common. Increasing
S partially mitigates this e↵ect since it increases the size of incentive-compatible transfers
between borrowers.
Our simulated repayment rates vary between around 85% to close to 100% as the vari-
ance of borrower income decreases. These high repayment rates follow from the fact that
the calibrated mean return R¯ is higher than the lender’s cost of funds, ⇢, so near perfect
repayment is attainable for su ciently low variance. However, these values are fairly typical
24We perform one exercise in the appendix, where we vary ph  pm while holding p,Rh, Rm constant. The
confound here is that the mean return also varies as we vary ph and pm.
25One complication arises, namely the possibility of negative income realizations. For simplicity, we allow
these to occur, but we assume that a) only borrowers with positive incomes can assist others with repayment,
and b) to repay that borrower’s loan, her group members need only transfer r, not r   yi where yi is her
(negative) income realization.
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Figure 1: Simulation results for uncorrelated borrower returns. Explicit joint liability results
are in the left column and implicit joint liability in the right column. Each figure plots
the relevant object (repayment rate, interest rate and borrower welfare) for three levels of
social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The standard deviation of the individual borrower’s income
is varied on the horizontal axis of each figure.
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for microfinance repayment rates. For example, in de Quidt et al. (2013) we conservatively
estimate a repayment rate in the MIX Market dataset of around 0.92. Using the simulated
repayment rate, we can obtain the zero-profit interest rate and borrower welfare. The net
interest rate varies between 10% and 30% per year (again, these are not unreasonable val-
ues for the microfinance context), while borrower welfare varies between around 1.8 and 3.7
multiples of the loan size.
One of the most striking lessons we learn from the graphs is that the interest rate,
repayment rate and borrower welfare are highly insensitive to social capital under explicit
joint liability. The reason is that social capital is only shifting the borrowers from default to
repayment in states of the world where they can a↵ord to help one another and where the
joint liability penalty is not already su cient. The probability that such a state occurs is
lower, the bigger the group of borrowers. Meanwhile, implicit joint liability is highly sensitive
to social capital, since the only sanction available is coming through the social capital. For
example, at   = 0.5, the IJ repayment rate is 91% for S = 0.1, 98% for S = 0.25, and close
to 100% for S = 0.5, while the EJ repayment rate is fixed at 98% throughout.26
In order to more easily compare EJ and IJ, in Figure 2 we overlay the welfare curves for
EJ and IJ. The simulation exercise emphasizes much of the core intuition from the model.
When S is low, explicit joint liability tends to dominate since the joint liability clause gives
the borrowers an additional incentive to help one another. When S is high, implicit joint
liability dominates, due to the perverse e↵ect of JL - the borrowers now have enough social
capital to help one another when they can a↵ord to do so, but are not penalized in states of
the world where only some of the group can repay.
To give a numerical example of the magnitudes of the welfare gains from EJ and IJ as
a function of S, consider the case of a standard deviation of project returns of 0.5. Here
for social capital worth 10% of the loan size for example, the welfare attainable under IJ,
V IJ = 2.29 is 32.4% lower than the welfare under EJ V EJ = 3.39. This highlights the
clear welfare gains that are possible under EJ in environments with low S. These gains
disappear however for higher levels of S. With social capital worth 50% of the loan size, the
welfare attainable under EJ V EJ = 3.39 is in fact 5 % lower than that attainable under IJ,
V IJ = 3.56. The higher levels of social capital make it incentive compatible to help each
other out, when they are able to, while not being punished when not the whole group is able
to repay.
The graph also highlights that the welfare under the EJ and IJ contracts are almost
26Note that in de Quidt et al. (2013) we find that the interest rate and borrower welfare are sensitive to
social capital when the lender is a monopolist, since higher social capital relaxes IC2, and therefore enables
the lender to increase the interest rate. The non-profit lender, as modeled in this paper, does not do this.
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completely overlapping when S = 0.3.
Figure 2: Simulation results for uncorrelated borrower returns. Explicit joint liability results
are in red and implicit joint liability in blue. The figure plots borrower welfare for three
levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The standard deviation of the individual borrower’s
income is varied on the horizontal axis.
While these results illustrate the problems with strict EJ,27 we also interpret them as
showing why EJ should not be prematurely dismissed as an important contractual tool (as
also recently argued by Banerjee, 2012). Many of the candidates for alternative mechanisms
discussed in the literature are complex and potentially di cult to implement, so we have
focused on two extremely simple mechanisms that we feel are empirically relevant. What we
find is that implicit joint liability can perform very well, provided borrowers have enough
social capital: borrowers have to be willing to impose sanctions on one another worth at least
30% of their loan size. Meanwhile EJ functions well in our simulations even for low levels
of social capital. This illustrates how important the lending environment, and in particular
borrowers’ social ties are for determining the preferred contract in our framework.
5.3 Correlated returns
As an extension, we now present simulation results when borrowers’ returns are correlated.
A number of recent papers have analyzed how correlated returns a↵ect repayment behavior
under joint liability lending.28. As a simple extension, we consider how our EJ and IJ bor-
rowers are a↵ected by introducing positively or negatively correlated returns into the model.
27Problems that have also received attention in Besley and Coate (1995), Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004), Bhole
and Ogden (2010), Rai and Sjo¨stro¨m (2010) and Allen (2014).
28For example, La↵ont (2003), Ahlin and Townsend (2007) and Allen (2014).
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We simulate the borrowing group’s per-period income vector [Y1, ..., Yn] as a multivariate
Normal distribution. We fix the standard deviation at 0.5, the midpoint of the range con-
sidered in the previous section, and vary the pairwise correlation between group members
from  0.25 to 0.45.29 We graph the results in Figures 3 and 4.30
The main conclusion from this analysis is that for a given level of social capital, EJ is
significantly more sensitive to the strength of correlation between borrower incomes. EJ
requires all loans to be repaid. When borrower incomes are only weakly correlated, there
will typically only be a small number of failures in a group, which are relatively easy for
the other members to assist with. With a strongly positive correlation this is no longer the
case, it becomes more common to have large numbers of failures. In this environment IJ
is an advantage because the borrowers are not penalized when their partners default. This
becomes evident when comparing the gradient of the IJ curves relative to the EJ curves as
the correlation increases.
Figure 3: Simulation results for correlated borrower returns. Explicit joint liability results
are in red and implicit joint liability in blue. The figure plots borrower welfare for three
levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The correlation between pairs of borrower’s returns
is varied on the horizontal axis.
29For correlation smaller than  0.25 we essentially have 100% repayment everywhere, and for greater than
0.45 there is typically no lending equilibrium.
30Note that the graphs are less smooth than those in Figure 1. This is because for the benchmark
simulations we are able to reuse the same underlying random draws for each set of output realizations,
simply by rescaling as the standard deviation changes. This is not possible when considering variously
correlated returns, so we need to generate a new sample of borrower output realizations for each value of
the correlation coe cient, and this naturally introduces some extra noise.
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Figure 4: Simulation results for correlated borrower returns. Explicit joint liability results
are in the left column and implicit joint liability in the right column. Each figure plots the
relevant object (repayment rate, interest rate and borrower welfare) for three levels of social
capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The correlation between pairs of borrower’s returns is varied on
the horizontal axis of each figure.
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6 Conclusion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that MFIs making individual liability loans still commonly use
group repayment meetings. Gine´ and Karlan (2014) found that removing joint liability but
retaining groups had no average e↵ect on repayment, but seemed to increase repayment
among borrowers with high social capital and reduced it among borrowers with low social
capital. We ask whether groups do more than just facilitate the lender’s operations.
We show that when individually liable borrowers have su cient social capital to continue
to guarantee one another’s repayments, which we call implicit joint liability (IJ), they can
replicate or improve on the repayment performance of explicit joint liability (EJ). However
this first result does not depend upon the use of groups, provided borrowers are able to side
contract on loan repayments outside of repayment meetings.
We next show that when individual and group repayment meetings are costly, mutual
insurance or IJ are easier to sustain under group lending, because IJ depends crucially on the
interest rate, which in turn depends on the share of total meeting costs borne by the lender.
Group meetings reduce the lender’s share of meeting costs, enhancing the advantages of IJ.
The second experimental paper highlighting the role of groups is Feigenberg et al. (2013).
They find that varying meeting frequency for a subset of individually liable borrowing groups
seemed to have persistent positive e↵ects on repayment rates. They suggest that this is due
to improved informal insurance among these groups due to higher social capital. We analyze
situations under which microcredit might induce borrowers to create social capital, which
in turn enables them to sustain IJ. We derive conditions under which group lending is more
likely than individual lending to create social capital. Relating to one of the key findings of
Feigenberg et al. (2013), we derive conditions under which more frequent meetings, modeled
here as an increase in the amount of time borrowers and loan o cers must spend in loan
repayment meetings, increase borrowers’ incentive to invest in social capital. This provides a
theoretical foundation for Feigenberg et al. (2013)’s observation. However, in our framework
it is ine cient for lenders to do this in the absence of some other friction preventing borrowers
from privately coordinating among themselves.
Finally, we carry out a simulation exercises to assess the quantitative magnitudes of the
e↵ects of alternative forms of lending, as well as some of the relevant thresholds of social
capital. We find that EJ is insensitive the the level of social capital, while IJ is sensitive and,
when borrower incomes are uncorrelated, outperforms EJ for social capital worth at least
30% of the loan size. When borrowers’s incomes are positively correlated the advantages of
IJ are increased.
In addition to fitting some of the key findings from Gine´ and Karlan (2014) and Feigenberg
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et al. (2013), our model makes at least two new empirical predictions, for which unfortu-
nately we believe the relevant data do not currently exist. The first is that the benefits of
joint liability are non-monotone in social capital, such that we should expect to see lenders
using joint liability in intermediate, but not low or high social capital environments. The
second is that group lending without joint liability, to the extent it creates social capital, is
more valuable in communities with low than with high preexisting social capital, so among
individual liability lenders we might expect the use of groups to be negatively correlated
with social capital.
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A Mathematical appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Comparing the expressions for SˆEJA and Sˆ
IJ
A , it is immediate that Sˆ
EJ
A < Sˆ
IJ
A since
⇡EJA = ⇡
IJ
A and  ⇡
EJ
A R¯  ⇢ > 0 by Assumption 3.
Now consider Case B. It is obvious that if SˆEJ = 0, SˆIJ > SˆEJ , since SˆIJ > 0. Suppose
therefore that SˆEJ > 0. We have:
SˆIJ   SˆEJ =  ⇡
EJ
B R¯  ⇢
 ⇡EJB (1   ⇡EJB )
+
⇢
 ⇡IJB
  ⇢
 ⇡EJB
.
So:
 ⇡IJB ⇡
EJ
B (1   ⇡EJB )(SˆIJ   SˆEJ)
= ⇡IJB ( ⇡
EJ
B R¯  ⇢)  pm(1  p)(1   ⇡EJB )⇢
=  ⇡IJB ⇡
EJ
B R¯  ⇢+ (1  ⇡IJB )⇢  pm(1  p)⇢+  ⇡EJB pm(1  p)⇢
=  p2R¯  ⇢+  pph(1  p)R¯  pm(1  p)⇢
+  (p4(1  p) + ph4(1  p)2)R¯ + (1  ⇡IJB )⇢+  ⇡EJB pm(1  p)⇢.
The last line uses the fact that ⇡IJB ⇡
EJ
B = p
2 + pph(1  p) + p4(1  p) + ph4(1  p)2. This
expression is positive because of Assumption 3 and ph > pm.
Proof of Proposition 1
To compare IL and EJ, we consider first Case A, then Case B with ph > pm, and lastly Case
B with ph  pm.
In Case A, borrower repayment guarantees under IL o↵er no advantage over EJ, so
provided S   SˆEJA , EJ is the borrower welfare-maximizing contract (with indi↵erence for
S   SˆIJ). For S < SˆEJA , borrower will not mutually guarantee under EJ and also default
unless their partner is successful, so IL is preferred to EJ:
V EJA (S)  V ILA (S) =
8>>><>>>:
   p(1 p)(R¯ ⇢)(1  p)(1  p2) S < SˆEJA
 p(1 p)(R¯ ⇢)
(1  p)(1  p(2 p)) S 2 [SˆEJA , SˆIJA )
0 S   SˆIJA
In Case B, with ph > pm, EJ dominates IL when borrowers guarantee one another under
EJ but not under IL, for S 2 [SˆEJB , SˆIJB ), so EJ is preferred in this region. However, once IJ
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is possible, for S   SˆIJB , it dominates EJ. This is because borrower 1 repays her own loan in
state (Rm, 0), while she would default under EJ. We have:
V EJB (S)  V ILB (S) =
8>>><>>>:
   p(1 p)(R¯ ⇢)(1  p)(1  p2) S < SˆEJB
 4(1 p)(R¯ ⇢)
(1  p)(1  (p+4(1 p))) S 2 [SˆEJB , SˆIJB )
   pm(1 p)(R¯ ⇢)(1  (p+ph(1 p)))(1  (p+4(1 p))) S   SˆIJB
Lastly, in Case B with ph  pm, EJ is always dominated by IL. This is because under EJ
the highest possible repayment probability is p+4(1  p), which is weakly smaller than p,
the lowest possible repayment probability under IL. Therefore we do not need to know the
ordering of SˆEJB and Sˆ
IJ
B for this case - EJ will never be used.
Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose total meeting costs are higher under ILG: 32( f + 2 v) > 2( f +  v) or 2 v >  f .
Suppose also that S 2 [SˆIJG, SˆIJI). Then group lending sustains IJ but individual lending
does not. Welfare is higher under group lending if:
R¯  ⇢  32( f + 2 v)
1   (p+ ph(1  p)) >
R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v)
1   p
Taking the limit as  f ! 2 v, it is clear that this condition holds strictly, while SˆIJG > SˆIJI
continues to hold, thus the corollary follows for a non-trivial interval of costs by a standard
open set argument.
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider a hypothetical equilibrium in which the borrowers do invest in social capital and
repay with probability ⇡IJ ⌘ p+ ph(1  p). They are charged rˆ = ⇢+ f+ v⇡IJ .
At the beginning of the first period, the borrower and her partner pay cost ⌘ and create
social capital. Then, each period with probability p +4(1   p), both loans are repaid and
both contracts renewed. With probability pm(1  p), only borrower i’s loan is repaid. As a
result, at the beginning of the next period, she must again pay cost ⌘ to create social capital
with her new partner.31
31Since no social capital is destroyed on the equilibrium path, the S created with the original partner is
not lost but cannot be leveraged in the credit contract.
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Consider an ILI borrower in the first period, or one whose partner has just defaulted.
IC1 is satisfied by the modified Assumption 3 in footnote 17. As we are considering an
equilibrium in which she invests in social capital, we use an “IJI” superscript to denote the
fact that IJ is taking place. If she invests in social capital with the new partner, she earns
utility U , defined as follows:
U IJI1 = S   ⌘ +W IJI1
where
W IJI1 =
 
R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v)
 
+  (p+4(1  p))W IJI1 +  pm(1  p)U IJI1 .
The first term in W is the per-period utility under ILI. The second term represents the
continuation payo↵ when both borrowers repay and have their contracts renewed. This
occurs with probability p +4(1   p). In this case she earns W IJI1 next period. The third
term represents the continuation payo↵ if she repays but her partner defaults, which occurs
with probability pm(1  p). In this case she matches with a new partner and therefore earns
U IJI1 next period.
Substituting for W , we can write U as:
U IJI1 = S   ⌘ +
 
R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v)
 
+  pm(1  p)U IJI1
1   (p+4(1  p))
=
 
R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v)
 
+ (1   (p+4(1  p)))(S   ⌘)
1   ⇡IJ .
Now we check for a deviation. In this context, a deviation is to defer investing in social
capital by one period, i.e. to undergo one period without social capital (and therefore with
repayment probability p), then invest in social capital next period. She prefers not to deviate
if:
U IJI1  
 
R¯  ⇢  2( f +  v)
 
+  pU IJI1 . (10)
The first term on the right hand side represents the per-period utility of a borrower under
ILI without social capital, paying an interest rate of rˆ =
⇢+ f+ v
p (recall that we assumed the
lender adjusts r to reflect the repayment probability). With probability p her loan is repaid,
and in the next period she invests in S, thus receiving continuation value U IJI1 . Substituting
for U IJI1 and rearranging yields condition (3). It is easy to check that this condition is
equivalent to checking whether welfare is higher under an always-invest than a never-invest
regime.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Hypothesize an equilibrium in which borrowers invest in social capital. IC1 is satisfied by
the modified Assumption 3 in footnote 17.
We need to check that no borrower prefers to deviate by deferring their investment by
one period, exactly as in Lemma 2. We define the value functions analogously to those in
the proof of Lemma 2:
U IJG1 = S   ⌘ +W IJG1
W IJG1 =
✓
R¯  ⇢  1
2
( f + 2 v)(3  2 )
◆
+  (p+4(1  p))W IJG1 +  pm(1  p)U IJG1 .
Where the possession of social capital reduces the borrowers’ cost of group meetings by
 ( f + 2 v). The appropriate substitutions yield:
U IJG1 =
R¯  ⇢  12( f + 2 v)(3  2 ) + (1   (p+4(1  p)))(S   ⌘)
1   ⇡IJ .
There will be no deviation if U IJG1  
 
R¯  ⇢  32( f + 2 v)
 
+  pU IJG1 . Simplifying yields
condition (4).
B Simulation approach
This Appendix outlines the algorithm used to simulate the core model. The simulation was
implemented in R. The intuition of the simulation procedure is very straightforward. We
use a random sample of N groups with n members each. A group merely constitutes a vector
of income realizations. These incomes are drawn from some distribution function F . We
assume that F is a Normal distribution with µ = R¯ = 1.6, however we allow the standard
deviation   to vary.
Given these income realizations, we compute the repayment rate that would arise under
each contract for a given interest rate r. This process gives us a repayment probability
function ⇡(r) under either contract.
Given this repayment probability function, we can then compute the break-even repay-
ment rate and thus the break-even interest rate under each contract, along with borrower
welfare. This then allows us to make comparisons between the two contractual forms.
We now describe in detail how the group-level repayment rate is computed, as this is
di↵erent under each contract type due to the di↵erent incentive constraints.
We denote an income realization of a group i with n borrowers is represented by an
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n-vector, Yi = (y1, ..., yn), where yj is group member j 2 1, . . . , n’s income draw.
We want to find a repayment rule analogous to the one outlined in the theory that allows
for larger groups and the continuous output distribution. The most obvious way to do this
is to construct for each Yi a “group bailout fund” that can be used for transfers between
group members to assist with repayments. Since the incentive constraints di↵er between EJ
and IJ, the construction of the group fund also di↵ers and is described below.
Group Lending without Joint Liability
The relevant incentive constraint under group lending without joint liability implies that
the maximum amount a group member j is willing to contribute to the group fund is cij =
min{max{0, yij},  S}.32 All the transfers are put into a common pool Ci. This pool is then
used to ensure the maximum possible number of repayments. The borrowers are sorted in
ascending order of the amount of transfer they require to repay their own loan. and transfers
made from the fund until it is exhausted.33 If m group members repay, then we obtain a
group level repayment rate ⇡i =
m
n . As this procedure is repeated for a sample of N groups,
we can then estimate the overall repayment probability as the simple average.
The procedure in pseudo-code (groups indexed by i and members by j):
Group Lending without JL
1. Generate an N ⇥ n matrix of income realizations from F .
2. For each possible value of the interest rate r:
(a) For each Yi: compute the maximum level of contributions that each group member
is willing to make to the common pool as cij = min{max{0, yij},  S}. This pot
amounts to Ci =
P
n cij
32As noted in the text, for a borrower with a negative income realization we assume that the group
members may pay o↵ her loan but do not pay to bring her income up to zero, and she cannot contribute to
the pot.
33This in fact implies that in some cases the worse o↵ borrowers will be bailing out the better o↵ borrowers.
In particular, it may be that an unlucky borrower gives her whole income to a partner to repay their loan,
but defaults on her own loan. This is because the worse o↵ borrowers require a larger transfer, which is thus
less likely to be incentive compatible. This mechanism achieves the maximum possible repayment rate and
therefore maximizes ex-ante expected utility.
This does not imply that a borrower with yj > r would ever default (i.e. be forced to choose between
losing  V and  S. The reason is that all borrowers “above” her in the bail out chain also have y > r, so
are making net positive contributions to the fund, which therefore has a positive “balance” when her turn
comes.
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(b) Compute the redistributions required by members to ensure repayment as tij =
max{0, r  max{0, yij}+ cij}.
(c) Order the required transfers in ascending order and redistribute the pot Ci until
it is exhausted.
(d) Compute the group level repayment rate ⇡i(r).
3. Given all the ⇡i, compute ⇡(r) =
P
i ⇡i
N .
Group Lending with Joint Liability
The simulation of this contract is more involved, since the relevant incentive constraint is
cij   (V + S). This implies that in order to construct the repayment rate ⇡, a number for
the continuation value V is needed. V however, is itself a function of ⇡.
The method proceeds as follows, for each possible value of r. First, we construct a set
of possible candidates for ⇡(r), denoted ⇡˜.34 Plugging these candidate ⇡˜ into the expression
for the value function, we obtain the associated V (⇡˜) schedule. Given these candidate V˜ ’s,
the group fund Ci is computed as follows. Each member is willing to contribute at most
cij = min{max{0, yij},  (V˜ +S)} toward repayment of the group’s loan obligations. Explicit
joint liability implies that the group will only repay when Ci =
P
n cij   nr. Thus a group’s
repayment rate is ⇡i = I[Ci   nr] 2 {0, 1}. Taking the average we obtain the simulated
repayment rate given ⇡ˆ(V (⇡˜)). In other words, taking as given a value for V (⇡˜), the implied
repayment rate ⇡ˆ is computed. Then, the true ⇡ (and thus the true V ) is found by solving
for the fixed point ⇡ = ⇡ˆ(V (⇡ˆ)). By iterating over r, we obtain the schedule ⇡(r) and the
associated V (⇡(r)).
The procedure in pseudo code:
Group Lending with JL
1. Generate an N ⇥ n matrix of income realizations from F .
2. For each interest rate r:
(a) Construct a set of candidates for ⇡˜(r).
(b) For each ⇡˜(r):
34These candidate ⇡’s exploit the monotonicity of the ⇡(r) schedule. The upper bound on ⇡ is given by
the previous iteration for a higher r (since repayment must be decreasing in r), while the lower bound on
⇡ is globally defined as ⇢
( R¯)
, since, by IC1,  R¯   r = ⇢⇡ in any equilibrium with positive repayment. We
then construct the candidate ⇡˜ as all values ranging between the upper and the lower bound based on some
step-size, say 0.001.
48
• For each Yi: compute the maximum level of contributions that each group
member is willing to make to the common pool as cij = min{max{0, yij},  (S+
V (⇡˜))}. This pot amounts to Ci =
P
n cij
• The group defaults if Ci < nr.
• Compute the group level repayment rate ⇡ˆi(⇡˜) 2 {0, 1}.
3. Given all the ⇡ˆi(V (p˜)), compute ⇡ˆ(V (⇡˜)) as the average and find the fixed point ⇡
such that ⇡ = ⇡ˆ(V (⇡)).
C Additional results
C.1 Simulation Results for high discount factor (  = 0.95)
The discount factor used in the main analysis is relatively low compared to more standard
values used in economics, so for robustness we repeat the uncorrelated returns simulations
for   = 0.95. We see a very similar pattern: 1) EJ is still highly insensitive to social capital;
2) IJ is highly sensitive; and 3) both perform approximately equally well for S = 0.3, IJ
performing better for high S and worse for low S. The key di↵erence is unsurprisingly
that the levels of the value functions are inflated by the higher discount factor. Results are
graphed in Figures 5 and 6.
C.2 Simulation Results for Piecewise Returns
As discussed in the main text, there is no straightforward approach to simulating the model
with the discrete returns distribution. The problem is one of too many degrees of freedom.
We think a sensible approach is to vary the di↵erence between the parameters ph and pm,
since we saw in the main draft that for ph < pm, EJ performs particularly badly. We vary
this di↵erence but still hold the sum ph+ pm = p¯ fixed, where p¯ = 0.921, estimated from the
MIX Market data by de Quidt et al. (2013).
We still have three parameters to tie down, namely Rm, Rh and the mean return. We
take the following approach. First, we assume down Rm = ⇢/p2, motivated by assumption
1 for the two player model. It implies that the medium return is high enough to repay an
individual liability loan. Given this and the value of R¯ = 1.6, we compute Rh imposing the
constraint that ph = pm. This thus gives us the value for Rh, when the di↵erence between
ph and pm is zero. Given these fixed values, we then simply vary the di↵erence between ph
and pm, holding everything else, including ph + pm, constant. When plotting the simulation
results as a function of the di↵erence between ph and pm in figure 7, we see that, as in the
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Figure 5: Simulation results for uncorrelated borrower returns with a discount factor of
0.95. Explicit joint liability results are in the left column and implicit joint liability in
the right column. Each figure plots the relevant object (repayment rate, interest rate and
borrower welfare) for three levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The standard deviation
of borrower’s returns is varied on the horizontal axis of each figure.
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Figure 6: Simulation results for uncorrelated borrower returns with a discount factor of 0.95.
Explicit joint liability results are in red and implicit joint liability in blue. The figure plots
borrower welfare for three levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The standard deviation
of the individual borrower’s income is varied on the horizontal axis.
theory with groups of two borrowers, EJ performs better the larger is ph pm. However, note
that as we increase ph relative to pm, the mean return is changing as well, so it is di cult to
say categorically what is driving the results.
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Figure 7: Simulation results for discrete borrower income distribution. Curves for explicit
joint liability are drawn in red, and implicit joint liability in blue. Each figure plots the
relevant object (repayment rate, interest rate and borrower welfare) for three levels of social
capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The di↵erence between ph and pm of individual borrower returns
is varied on the horizontal axis of each figure.
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